Fourth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the SCl on the implementation of 1559

United Nations S/2006/832

Security Council

19 October 2006

Fourth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the
Security Council on the implementation of Security Council
resolution 1559 (2004)

I. Introduction
1. The present report is my fourth semi-annual report to the Security
Council on
the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004).

2. In the six months since my last report, of 19 April 2006 (S/2006/248),
Lebanon
witnessed first political standstill, then severe deterioration and
prolonged
instability.

3. Lebanon's National Dialogue reconvened on 28 April and 16 May 2006 to
discuss the two remaining issues on its agenda, the Lebanese presidency and
the
arms of Hizbollah, amidst an increasingly tense political climate both
domestically
and with regard to Lebanese-Syrian relations.

4. On 1 and 2 June 2006 protests and clashes erupted after a television
programme
appeared to parody the Secretary-General of Hizbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.
Youths
from the southern suburbs of Beirut blocked the road to the airport with
burning
tyres and engaged in clashes with youths from the north-eastern suburbs.

5. In this context, the National Dialogue met on 8 June 2006; in the
session,
Lebanese political leaders agreed on a written code of conduct stipulating
that they
would refrain from attacking each other, in order to decrease the rising
political and
sectarian tension. On 29 June, the National Dialogue convened for the last
time to
date and adjourned, having reached no further agreements.

6. On 12 July, hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah after
Hizbollah
launched an unprovoked attack across the Blue Line, abducting two Israeli
soldiers
and killing several others. I have outlined the course of events and effects
of the
conflict elsewhere in my reports on the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006)
(S/2006/670 and S/2006/730), which was adopted on 11 August 2006 and led to
a
cessation of hostilities that has remained in effect since 14 August.

7. A tense political climate has continued to prevail in Lebanon. In its
midst, in a
worrying return to last year's climate of frequent assassinations and
terrorist acts, a
senior Lebanese security official survived an assassination attempt while
driving on
a road in south Lebanon on 5 September. Four of his aides and bodyguards
were
killed in the attack and five were wounded.

8. In the early morning hours of 15 October, six Lebanese civilians were
hurt
when three rockets were launched into a building in downtown Beirut, close
to both
United Nations headquarters and the Grand Serail which houses the Prime
Minister's offices. This disconcerting incident followed two other attacks
which had
not caused any casualties, with similar rocket launchers and with hand
grenades
against police stations in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the latest attacks,
the
Government of Lebanon has expanded the presence of the Internal Security
Forces
in Beirut by 800 men.

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)
9. Since the Council adopted resolution 1559 (2004) on 2 September 2004,
there
has been considerable progress towards its full implementation. In April
2005, the
full withdrawal of Syrian troops, military assets and military intelligence
apparatus
was achieved. Shortly afterwards, free and fair legislative elections were
conducted
in Lebanon (see S/2005/673). In my last report, I stated that with the
agreements
reached in the Lebanese National Dialogue, significant further progress
towards the
full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) had been made.

10. Additional progress has been made in recent months with the significant
and
historic deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south of the country
for
the first time in three decades. Moreover, Lebanese troops have taken up
positions
along the eastern part of the Blue Line for the first time ever, and have
deployed in
significant numbers along Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic.
These
steps represent important progress towards the full extension of the
Government of
Lebanon's control over all Lebanese territory and the fulfilment of the
requirements
of resolutions 425 (1978) and 1559 (2004) and the Taif Accords.

11. However, resolution 1559 (2004), and in particular its provisions
calling for
the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and
the
strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and
political
independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the
Government,
has yet to be implemented in full.
A. Withdrawal of foreign forces deployed in Lebanon

12. In my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) of 12
September
2006 (S/2006/730), I stated that to the best of the ability of the United
Nations to
ascertain, the only foreign forces currently deployed in Lebanon were those
serving
under the banner of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Israeli
troops, who had entered Lebanon in the course of the recent conflict,
returned
beyond the Blue Line on 1 October 2006, with the exception of their
deployment in
the divided village of Ghajar. I expect this presence to end shortly in the
context of a
trilateral discussion on security arrangements for the village.

I have previously reported on the otherwise complete withdrawal of Israeli
forces from all
Lebanese territory, in full compliance with this aspect of resolution 425
(1978), and on the full
withdrawal of all Syrian troops, military assets and the military
intelligence apparatus from
Lebanon, in full compliance with this aspect of resolution 1559 (2004). The
Security Council
has endorsed my conclusions in both respects.

B. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence
of Lebanon

1. Syrian intelligence apparatus and activity in Lebanon

13. The Government of Lebanon has stated to me that its efforts to
consolidate its
full control over all security services continue. Allegations have at times
been made,
including by the Government of Lebanon, that there continues to be Syrian
intelligence activity in Lebanon.2

2. Establishment of mutual diplomatic representation

14. Subsequent to my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004),
the Security Council adopted its resolution 1680 (2006) of 17 May 2006,
which
encouraged the delineation of borders between the Syrian Arab Republic and
Lebanon and the establishment of full diplomatic relations and
representation.

15. I have stated my expectation of the early initiation of a process
between
Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, based on an agreed action agenda,
which
will eventually lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.3 I
reiterate my
expectation in the light of the Council's position, as expressed in
resolutions 1680
(2006) and 1701 (2006). Steps towards the establishment of diplomatic
relations
between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon would significantly contribute
to
the stability of the region.

3. Delineation of the border

16. In addition to its call contained in resolution 1680 (2006) on the
Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the
Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border, the Council again
emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government
of
Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in its resolution 1701 (2006).

17. In the context of the general need for a delineation of the
Syrian-Lebanese
border, the Government of Lebanon has informed me that Syrian border police
maintained sand barriers and positions inside Lebanese territory in several
locations
during the last six months. The Government of Lebanon further informed me
that
there were mobile positions, some of which were also manned by Syrian border
police on occasion. The apparent uncertainty over the border in the areas
concerned
highlights, once again, the need for a comprehensive border delineation
agreement
between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, in the best interest of both
countries.

2 The Syrian Government stated in a letter to me dated 24 April 2006 that it
would "like to
reaffirm once again that all its troops, military assets and security
apparatus withdrew from
Lebanon on 26 April 2005" (S/2006/259, annex).

3 In my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) of 12
September 2006
(S/2006/730), I noted the assurances given to me by President Assad and
reiterated my
expectation of the early initiation of a process between the two countries,
based on an agreed
action agenda, which would eventually lead to the establishment of full
diplomatic relations. I
must recall in this context the statements made by the representative of the
Government of the
Syrian Arab Republic in the Security Council after Prime Minister Siniora's
address on 21 April
2006 (S/PV.5417) and in the letter addressed to me from the Government of
the Syrian Arab
Republic of 24 April 2006 (S/2006/259).

18. As regards delineation of the border in the Shab'a Farms area, Prime
Minister
Siniora enquired in a meeting between us on 21 April 2006 as to possible
steps to be
undertaken, from the perspective of the United Nations, for the sovereignty
of the
Shab'a Farms to be transferred from the Syrian Arab Republic to Lebanon. I
responded to the Prime Minister in a letter dated 5 June 2006. Prime
Minister
Siniora and I have discussed the matter further, including when I visited
Beirut
during my recent mission to the region and in connection with the Government
of
Lebanon's seven-point plan.

19. In the light of Syrian statements indicating that the Shab'a Farms area
is
Lebanese and considering the alternative path suggested by the Government of
Lebanon in its seven-point plan, I continue to investigate carefully the
complicated
cartographic, legal and political implications of such an approach and will
revert to
the Council in due course.4 In the meantime, I wish to reiterate my urgent
call on
the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to undertake the necessary steps to
delineate
their common border, in fulfilment of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006)
and
1701 (2006). Such steps would significantly contribute to the stability of
the region.

4. Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity
20. Subsequent to my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004)
(S/2006/248), persistent and provocative Israeli air incursions,
occasionally
reaching deep into Lebanese airspace and generating sonic booms over
populated
areas, continued to be a matter of serious concern (see S/2006/560). The
Government of Israel has continued to maintain its claim that such
overflights are
carried out for security reasons.

21. Israeli overflights have also continued since the cessation of
hostilities
between Israel and Hizbollah went into effect on 14 August 2006. I expect
that such
air incursions and violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which stand in
contradiction
to resolutions 425 (1978) and 1559 (2004) as well as resolution 1701 (2006)
itself,
will cease fully.

22. The recent hostilities between Israel and Hizbollah saw an extended
period of
time in which Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty and territorial
integrity. With
resolution 1701 (2006), a cessation of hostilities has been established,
which both
parties have by and large abided by, as I have reported in my report on the
implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2006/730).

23. The Government of Lebanon has also informed me of another alleged
violation
of Lebanese sovereignty by Israel.5

4 According to the seven-point plan, the Security Council might place the
Shab'a Farms area and
the adjacent Kafr Shuba hills temporarily under United Nations jurisdiction
until border
delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled in
accordance with
international law.

5 The Lebanese Government asserted to me that the assassination of an
official of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad in Lebanon on 26 May 2006 had been carried out by an
intelligence network
operating under the instruction of Israel. A press release from the Lebanese
delegation, dated
21 June 2006, stated that the Department of Intelligence of the Lebanese
Armed Forces had
uncovered a terrorist network working for Israel. One of the alleged members
of the network,
the press release further asserted, had admitted to several assassinations
carried out in Lebanon
at the behest of Israeli security services, including that of 26 May 2006.
The Israeli Government
has denied these claims.

C. Extension of Lebanese Government control over all
Lebanese territory

24. In my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), I
noted that
a number of serious incidents had emphasized the necessity for the
Government of
Lebanon, through its regular security and armed forces, to extend its
control over all
its territory, in order to maintain quiet along the Blue Line. As I stated,
the
Government of Lebanon, as the sole legitimate authority vested with a
monopoly on
the use of force throughout its territory, had to do more to exercise its
control
accordingly.

25. During the hostilities, the Lebanese Government reaffirmed its
determination
to extend its control over all of Lebanon's territory and to establish its
monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence. Prime Minister Siniora's seven-point plan
envisaged
that the Lebanese Government would extend its authority over its territory
through
its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or
authority
other than that of the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords. The
Lebanese
Council of Ministers adopted the seven-point plan as the official position
of the
Government of Lebanon on 27 July 2006. On 7 August 2006, the cabinet again
reaffirmed its commitment and decided to send 15,000 Lebanese soldiers to
the
south simultaneously with the withdrawal of the occupying Israeli forces
beyond the
Blue Line. The Council of Ministers also confirmed its readiness to accept
UNIFIL
support, if needed, in order to facilitate the deployment of the Lebanese
army troops
in the context of the implementation of the seven-point plan.

26. I wish to welcome again the significant and historic step taken by the
Government of Lebanon to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces to the south of
the
country. In addition to the first deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in
the
south in three decades, Lebanese troops have taken up positions along the
eastern
part of the Blue Line for the first time ever. As I have previously
reported, a
significant number of Lebanese troops have also been deployed along the
Lebanese
border with the Syrian Arab Republic.6

27. Since the cessation of hostilities came into effect in Lebanon on 14
August
2006, renewed reports of intercepted arms shipments have been brought to my
attention; such shipments would stand in contradiction to the arms embargo
imposed
by resolution 1701 (2006). I will endeavour to comply with my reporting
requirements on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), as expressed
in
paragraph 17 of that resolution, with regard to possible reports of arms
shipments. I
also call on all Member States, particularly Lebanon's neighbours, to ensure
full
compliance with the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 15 of resolution 1701
(2006).

6 As outlined in my last report on the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006) (S/2006/730), I
continue to believe that the imposition of an arms embargo, which is fully
consistent with the
Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006 that there should be no weapons or
authority in
Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, is a necessary measure given
the history of
arms traffic bound for Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. I also emphasized
the need for the
Syrian Arab Republic, in particular, to help enforce the provisions of
paragraphs 14 and 15 of
resolution 1701 (2006), given that it shares the sole land border with
Lebanon that is generally
open to traffic.

D. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

28. I continue to believe that disarmament must take place through a
political
process that will lead to the full restoration of the authority of the
Government of
Lebanon. If the ultimate purpose of disarmament is the establishment of a
strong
Lebanese State for all inhabitants of Lebanon, as the Taif Accords
stipulated, then
the disarming and disbanding of all remaining militias must be realized in
such a
way that it strengthens, rather than weakens, the central authorities. It is
a
definitional requirement of the state to enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate
use of
force throughout its territory. In that context, it is important that all
neighbouring
States abide by the arms embargo, as called for in resolution 1701 (2006).

1. Palestinian militias

29. The National Dialogue's decision to disarm Palestinian militias outside
the
camps has not been implemented within the six-month deadline, which ended on
26 August 2006. The National Dialogue, in its session on 16 May 2006, had
decided
to establish a committee tasked with following up on the implementation of
its
agreement.

30. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27
July
2006, according to which there should be no weapons or authority other than
that of
the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords, will further define a
political
process and a clear timeline for the full disarmament of Palestinian
militias in
Lebanon. I call for the issue to be settled as early as possible. I also
call on all donors
to support the efforts of the Government of Lebanon and of the United
Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

31. There have been a number of incidents underlining the importance of the
eventual full disarmament of Palestinian militias in Lebanon over the past
six
months. On 17 May 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian
militia
Fatah-Intifada, which is headquartered in Damascus and maintains a number of
bases on Lebanese territory, engaged in clashes after an army patrol
approached a
newly established Fatah-Intifada position in eastern Lebanon and came under
fire. A
Lebanese Armed Forces soldier and a Palestinian militant later died from
wounds
sustained in the subsequent exchanges of fire; another Lebanese soldier was
detained for several hours before he was released. The Lebanese Armed Forces
eventually took over the base; the Palestinian militants implicated in the
incident
were later arrested.

32. On 26 May 2006, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was
assassinated
together with his brother in southern Lebanon by a car bomb. A major
escalation
occurred two days later along the Blue Line, when at least eight rockets
were
launched across the Blue Line into Israel (see S/2006/560). The Palestinian
Islamic
Jihad initially claimed responsibility, but later retracted its assertion.
Israel
retaliated with air strikes against Lebanese bases of the Damascus-based
Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); a
subsequent
major exchange across the Blue Line also involved Hizbollah and escalated
into the
firing of rockets and missiles across the Blue Line by Hizbollah and the
Israel
Defense Forces. Later the same day, the Lebanese Armed Forces sent equipment
to
clear rubble at a PFLP-GC base but were denied entry to the base. Also the
same
day, PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril said in an interview with a Lebanese
newspaper
that his group coordinated all of their military action with Hizbollah, also
stating his
opposition to the disarmament of Palestinian militias in Lebanon.

33. Despite these incidents, I took positive note of the reopening of the
representative office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in
Lebanon on
15 May 2006. I have continued my dialogue on the issue of the Palestinian
militias
in Lebanon with the Chairman of PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, who has assured me of
his
full support for the restoration of the Lebanese Government's monopoly on
the use
of force throughout its territory.

2. Hizbollah

34. With regard to the armed component of Hizbollah, I wish to recall once
again
Prime Minister Siniora's address to the Council of 21 April 2006 (S/PV.5417)
and
the consensual decision of the Lebanese in the Taif Accords.7 The National
Dialogue extensively discussed the issue of Hizbollah's arms earlier this
year, but
did not reach agreement. Hizbollah continued to limit the authority of the
Government of Lebanon, especially in areas close to the Blue Line.

35. The eventual disarmament of Hizbollah in the sense of the completion of
its
transformation into a solely political party, consistent with the
requirements of the
Taif Accords, is a key element in ensuring a permanent end to the
hostilities and a
critical provision to be realized in the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006) and
in the full restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political
independence. A number of specific measures to further this purpose are
enumerated
in resolution 1701 (2006) and are in the process of being implemented, in
particular
the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free
of any
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of
Lebanon and of UNIFIL, which would constitute an important step towards the
disarming of all militias in Lebanon.

36. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27
July
2006, according to which there should be no weapons or authority other than
that of
the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords," will further define a
political
process and a clear timeline for the full disarmament of Hizbollah in the
sense of the
completion of its transformation into a solely political party. I call for
the disarmament
of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to be settled as early as
possible.

37. I note that Hizbollah, through its representatives in the Lebanese
Council of
Ministers, agreed to the cabinet decision of 27 July 2006.8 At the same
time, I have

7 Prime Minister Siniora repeated in his address that "the future role of
Hizbollah's weapons in
defending Lebanon is a matter of national debate. That debate will be
carried out in the context
of a strategy agreed upon by all Lebanese concerning how best to defend
Lebanon, against the
backdrop of the provisions of the Taif Accords of 1989, United Nations
resolutions regarding
Lebanon and the continued occupation of the Shab'a Farms, as well as the
long history of
incursions and violations of Lebanese territory by Israel. Reconciling those
considerations with
the natural obligation of the State to be the sole provider of security to
all its citizens and
residents, and the right of the State to have a monopoly over arms and to
exercise its full
authority throughout the country, is a major challenge to be addressed in
the period ahead."

8 I have also taken note of the statements by Hizbollah Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah in his
address to a major rally in southern Beirut on 22 September 2006 that "we
are not saying that
our weapons will remain forever. It is not logical for these weapons to
remain forever. There is
bound to be an end to them". taken note of further statements by Hizbollah
representatives that stand in
contradiction to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

38. In this context, I note again that a dialogue with parties other than
the
Lebanese authorities is indispensable in order to realize the implementation
of the
mandate contained in resolution 1559 (2004) to disarm and disband all
Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias. I expect to continue my dialogue with such
parties, in
particular with the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which maintain close relations with Hizbollah.

39. Against this background, I wish to reiterate my call on all parties with
the
ability to influence Hizbollah to support its transformation into a solely
political
party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords, as a means to
achieve
the full disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. I also
reiterate my
call to all Member States, particularly Lebanon's neighbours, to ensure
compliance
with the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006),
which is
a measure facilitating the full implementation of the relevant provisions of
the Taif
Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the
disarmament of militias in Lebanon.

E. Presidential election process

40. The issue of the Lebanese presidency was discussed in several rounds of
the
National Dialogue until the participants in the National Dialogue "agreed to
disagree"
on the subject in their seventh round of consultations. In this context, I
also recall
Prime Minister Siniora's address to the Security Council on 21 April 2006.9

III. Observations

41. Over the past two years, there has been considerable progress towards
the full
implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The Syrian Arab Republic has
withdrawn
its troops, military assets and military intelligence apparatus. Free and
fair
legislative elections have been conducted. The Lebanese National Dialogue
manifested further progress. In the past few months, there has been
additional
progress with the extension of the Government's control over Lebanese
territory, in
particular in the south and along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic.
However, resolution 1559 (2004), and in particular its provisions calling
for the
disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the
strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and
political independence
of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government, has yet
to be
implemented in full.

42. In the past six months, Lebanon has suffered a severe setback. Instead
of
making further strides towards completing its political transformation and
reaping
the economic rewards of political progress, Lebanon confronts challenges of
a
magnitude unseen since the end of the civil war. Moreover, since the end of
the
hostilities, a tense political climate has prevailed, with manifold
challenges
confronting the Lebanese in their quest to reconstruct their country, their
polity and
their economy.

9 Prime Minister Siniora stated that "the majority in parliament considers
the extension of
President Lahoud's term in September 2004 for three more years to have been
the result of
interference and coercion by Syria - which had great influence over the
Lebanese parliament at
that time - against all of the advice discouraging such heavy-handed
interference" (S/PV.5417).

43. The United Nations remains committed to supporting Lebanon, its
Government
and its people as they face the enormous task of recovering the momentum on
the
path to consolidating the Lebanese State as an authority of the people, by
the people,
for the people.

44. I would like to express my thanks to all countries that have already
provided
assistance to the Lebanese, be it in the form of troop contributions to
UNIFIL,
bilateral technical aid, or through financial support. Such assistance will
continue to
be needed as the Lebanese once again embrace their fate of economic and
political
reconstruction. I also emphasize that all such assistance should be lent in
ways that
contribute to the consolidation of the Government's monopoly on the use of
force
throughout its territory.

45. In the months ahead, much remains to be done. With the adoption of
resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006) and with repeated Lebanese cabinet
decisions to extend the Government's authority over all Lebanese territory,
a new
framework has been established for the full implementation of all provisions
of
resolution 1559 (2004). A catalogue of measures has been laid down that
constitute
a road map for the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The
Government
of Lebanon, with significant international support, is undertaking important
steps
that will help it to fully implement resolution 1559 (2004). Achieving this
goal,
however, continues to depend on both the Lebanese and on the cooperation of
parties other than the Lebanese.

46. In the months ahead, Lebanon will have to engage again in a truly
national and
inclusive dialogue. The disarming and disbanding of Lebanese and
non-Lebanese
militias, which lies at the heart of the political transformation Lebanon
has been
undergoing and is a necessary element to complete, at long last, Lebanon's
consolidation as a sovereign and democratic State, can only be achieved
through an
inclusive process that addresses the political and economic interests of all
Lebanese
and of those living in Lebanon.

47. It is my deep hope that the opportunities born from conflict will be
seized
upon and that Lebanon may once again rise from the ashes of destruction and
war. I
emphasize once again in this context that Hizbollah's transformation into a
solely
political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords, is a
key
element in ensuring a permanent end to hostilities and in the full
restoration of
Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

48. For the purpose of achieving this goal, on the path towards the greater
objective of consolidating the Lebanese State, it is indispensable that all
parties who
have influence in Lebanon support a constructive political process. I note
in this
context that the cooperation of outside parties is explicitly called for in
resolutions
1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006), and I join these calls.

49. The establishment of full diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the
Syrian
Arab Republic and their delineation of the shared border, including, in
particular, in
the Shab'a Farms area, through a bilateral agreement would constitute
significant
steps towards promoting peace and security in the region. Mindful of the
importance
of border delineation to the Lebanese, I am expeditiously working to
establish in
S/2006/832
10 06-57996
full the cartographic, legal and political implications of the approach
suggested in
Lebanon's seven-point plan and will revert to the Council. I also wish to
call for the
Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to address in their bilateral contacts the
issue of
Lebanese detainees in Syrian custody.

50. I reiterate my call on all parties and actors to support Lebanon's
reconstruction
and political transformation and to urgently take all enabling measures to
this end,
as outlined in the Taif Accords and in resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006)
and
1701 (2006).

51. I will continue my efforts for the purpose of the full implementation of
these
and all other relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to the
restoration of
the territorial integrity, full sovereignty and political independence of
Lebanon and
the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace throughout the
entire
Middle Eastern region, consistent with all relevant Security Council
resolutions.